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REPARATION AWAm UNDER RATES SET BY INTERSTATE COZIZERCE
CosIussIoN
THE power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to award reparation for
the exaction of unreasonable rates I is unquestioned, where the rates have
been initiated by carriers.2 But in Arizocs Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry.,3 a case of first impression, the Supreme Court, with two justices
dissenting, has denied this power where the unreasonable rate has been
prescribed by the Commission itself through inadequate evidence or an
erroneous finding. The Court premised its decision on the legislative char-
acter of the Commission's rate orders and the conclusive presumption that
they are reasonable. And since the Commission acts in a judicial capacity
in awarding reparation,4 it was held that it could not ignore the validity
of its legislative enactments and retroactively deprive the carrier of the
protection of its previous order. The extent of the Commission's power was
thus determined to be the formulation of a new rate order for the future.5
Although the decision seemingly effectuates an equality by confining
the shipper to the same remedy as the carrier, that is, a proceeding for
a new rate, it might be argued that the position of the carrier is now the
more advantageous. For the carrier's more intimate knowledge of the opera-
tion of a new schedule permits it to determine the question of reasonable-
ness far earlier than the shipper, and its superior organization enables it
to apply for relief more quickly and effectively than the comparatively
unorganized and necessarily less informed shipper. On the other hand,
the carriers position would have been the more difficult had the court held
that the fixing of a maximum, or a maximum and minimum, rate did not
relieve the carrier from the duty imposed by the Interstate Commerce Act
to charge only a reasonable rate.6 It would be forced to reduce a rate to
protect the shipper where the maximum was unreasonably high, but would
136 STAT. 554 (1910), 49 U. S. C. § 16 (1) (1926); AILLER, LEGISLATIVE
EvOLuTION OF THE INTERSTATE ConmiERcE AcT (1930) 181.
2 The power to initiate rates has never been taken from the carriers
under the Federal system of regulation. See Skinner & Eddy Corp. v.
United States, 249 U. S. 557, 564, 39 Sup. Ct. 375, 378 (1919).
52 Sup. Ct. 183 (Jan. 4, 1932) aff'g 49 F. (2d) 563 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
1931).
4See Baer Bros. v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 233 U. S. 479, 486, 34 Sup.
Ct. 641, 644 (1914).
5State commissions have been held to be likewise limited in power.
El Paso & S. W. R. R. v. Arizona Corporation Commission, 51 F. (2d)
573 (D. Ariz. 1931) and cases there cited. But it must be noted that in
these cases the system of regulation provided for the fixing of rates ex-
elusively by the Commission with no possibility of discretionary adjustment
by the carrier, and no statutory grant of the reparation power for un-
reasonable rates to the Commission. Only in Northern Pac. Ry. v. Dep't
of Public Works, 136 Wash. 389, 240 Pac. 362 (1925) has the limitation
been incorporated into a system of the Federal type.
641 STAT. 475 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (4) (5) (1926).
[625]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
be unable to raise a rate to protect itself where the maximum was unrea-
sonably low. And its inability to raise charges would give no right to
reparation from the shippers, although the converse would be true if It
failed to lower them. While the opinion does not discuss the shipper's posi-
tion, and only mentions the limitations on the carrier, it may be inferred
from the result reached that in the cour's estimation the latter equities
proved the more persuasive.
The dissent 7 is based on the desirability of maintaining a flexible system
of administration whereby the Commission may prospectively control an
inherently experimental rate structure, and retrospectively correct any
errors by an award of reparation to injured shippers.8 It was argued
by the appellant that to limit the Commission to the institution of now
schedules for rectification of errors would impose upon it the unbearable
burden of a constant re-examination of its rates. The majority opinion,
however, considered such re-exhmination a necessary incident of the rate-
making power, and further pointed out that with the Act in its present
form the vast majority of rates would remain carrier made.
The instant decision actually denies the power of the Commission to
award reparation only in situations where the unreasonable rate results
from an erroneous order. But a change in conditions may cause a rate
which was accurate when enacted by the Commission to become unreason-
able. The Commissioh itself has in such a case awarded reparaton,G
and it would seem highly undesirable to divest it of this power. Otherwise
the carrier will be permitted to evade its duty by the unwarrantable pro-
tection of a rate predicated on circumstances which no longer exist, a
manifest contravention of the prohibition to charge any excessive rate.10
The power to award reparation may also be questioned in the case of
rates based on a general adjustment order of the Commission, In the
recent case of Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry. Co.,"1 it was held
that such rates would not be considered Commission made inasmuch as
the adjustment orders were based only on the general level of all rates,
and did not result from investigation of any particular rates. Consequently
the reparation order was affirmed. Since the individual maladjustments
which inevitably follow sweeping orders can only be partially alleviated
by the Commission's use of "saving clauses" whereby adversely affected
interests may except themselves upon proper showing,12 this power to
award reparation is necessary to secure an adequate remedy to injured
shippers. It is to be hoped therefore that the instant decision will not
be interpreted to restrict the Commission's power to award reparation
in this situation, and in that involving unreasonableness due to changed
conditions.
7 The dissent follows the concurring opinion in Eagle Cotton 011 Co.
v. Southern Ry. Co., infra note 11, wherein it is submitted that the Com-
mission has power to award reparation whether the rates are carrier
made or Commission made.
8 Cf. 2 SHARFmAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1931) 368-
371.
9 Arizona Corporation Commission v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 156 I.
C. C. 418 (1929).
10 Cf. Marinette, T. & W. R. R. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin,
195 Wis. 462, 465, 466, 218 N. W. 724, 725 (1928).
1151 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).




ATTACHMENT OF CORPORATE Assrs AFTER DISTRIBUTION TO STOCKHOLDES
AS A BASIS FOR JURISDICTION OVER THE ConroRAxTON
A GEORGIA corporation exchanged all its assets for stock in a Delaware
corporation which it then distributed to its own stockholders.1 The Dela-
ware corporation, charging misrepresentation as to the value of the assets
conveyed, sequestered 2 its stock held in the name of the Georgia stock-
holders, and brought a bill in equity in Delaware asking for a determina-
tion of its damages and for a sale of the stock in an amount sufficient
to satisfy its claim.3 The insolvent Georgia corporation, concededly a
necessary party,4 did not appear. The court in Nyc Odorless Incrator
Corporation v. Nye Odorless Crewmto,'y Co. held that sequestration of
the stock did not subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of the Dela-
ware court and further that the action could not be sustained as one
qasi in rem to try the title to the stock since the plaintiff's claim thereto
depended upon fraud in the sale and a wrongful distribution of the pro-
ceeds, neither of which was a proper issue in a suit brought strictly to try
title. The stock was considered to be only incidentally involved as an asset
subject to levy had a judgment been obtained.
Any claim of jurisdiction over the Georgia corporation must be predi-
cated upon its interest in the sequestered stock. Although the satisfaction
of a judgment procured by creditors directly against stockholders for the
funds wrongfully distributed 6 would extinguish the debt of the corpora-
tion to them, its legal interest in those funds is limited to a right of
action against its stockholders for the benefit of creditors.7 To hold that
such a right of action in itself confers jurisdiction upon sequestration
'Part of the stock received by the Georgia corporation was sold and
the proceeds distributed in cash to its stockholders, all of whom resided
outside of Delaware.
2Why sequestration was used instead of attachment does not appear.
Attachment by a corporation of its own stock has been allowed. See
Scripture v. Soapstone Co., 50 N. H. 571 (1871) (the attachment was
not at issue but the court made no objection to the procedure). Garniuh-
ment was allowed in Norton v. Norton, 43 Ohio St. 509, 3 N. E. 348
(1885); see 7 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 5S21.
3 In the alternative there was a prayer that the stock should be returned
to the Georgia corporation.
- This admission seems to have been based on Swan Land & Cattle Co.
v. Frank, 148 U. S. 603, 13 Sup. Ct. 691 (1893), a case almost precisely
inopoint. Although the report of the principal case gives the erroneous
impression that all the stockholders appeared generally, from private in-
formation it was learned that one stockholder had sold his stock and did
not appear. Without this fact the principal case might have bcen dis-
tinguished from the Swan ease which was not against all shareholders.
156 Atl. 176 (Del. Ch. 1931).
6 Creditors have been allowed to sue by statute. See Anx. DIG. STAT.
(Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 1728; 2 MICH. COMP. LAWS (Cahill, 1915)
§ 10,018 (joint and several liability); 2 MIsS. CuM. CODE (1930) § 41419
(joint and several liability). They may also sue on the theory that dis-
tributed capital constitutes a trust for their benefit, or as for a fraudulent
conveyance. See eases cited in Note (1928) 55 A. L. R. 8, 11G.
7 Frederick v. McRae, 157 Minn. 366, 196 N. W. 270 (1923); see I
TH01MPSON, CORPORATIONS § 5346; 2 CooK, CORPORATIONs (Sth ed. 1923) §




of the stock would permit a court to take jurisdiction over causes of
action against a foreign defendant by sequestration of property in the
hands of any person against whom the defendant might have a cause of
action. This would be an extension even of the rule under garnishment
statutes, whereby the transient presence of the garnishee gives jurisdic-
tion over the principal debtor for purposes of garnishment, s and would
render a mere attachment of the garnishee's property a sufficient basis
for jurisdiction over the principal debtor.
By statute in some jurisdictions g a judgment against the corporation
must be obtained before suit can be brought against its directors or stock-
holders for illegal distribution of assets, or to enforce the statutory lia-
bility of the stockholders for unpaid subscriptions.10 While in the latter
type of action a judgment has not been required where the corporation
is clearly insolvent," yet the decisions asserting this exception have in-
volved contract creditors or liquidated claims. To extend it to actions In
tort for unliquidated damages would force stockholders of a corporation
which had distributed its assets to defend any clainj agains the cor-
poration for such distribution, no matter how ill founded, Therefore,
although it was contended in the principal case that it would be a useless
gesture to sue the insolvent Georgia corporation, it would seem preferable
to require that unliquidated claims be reduced to judgment in order to
protect stockholders from suits of doubtful merit and to enable them to
limit themselves to personal defences without trying the case for the
corporation.
Once having established the plaintiff as a judgment creditor the place
of trial of the remaining issues becomes largely a question of convenience
in joining individual stockholders. If the liability of each stockholder be
jlimited to a pro rata, share of the funds distributed"2 all must be sued
to recover the full amount of the claim. But in general the liability of
stockholders would seem to be joint and several"3 to the amount of the
distribution individually received, contribution from the others being as-
sured by allowing them to be joined by a cross bill, or, if some are out-
side the jurisdiction, by allowing suit for contribution where service can
be made.14
8 Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 626 (1005). For incon-
veniences resulting from similar cases see Beale, The Exerceo of Jaq8-
diction in Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt (1913) 27 HAW. L, hV.
107.
9 ME. REV. STAT. (1930) c. 56, §§ 102, 103; 3 FLA. GEN. LAWS (Skill-
man, 1927) § 6581; R. 1. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 3503.
'. 6 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS, § 4962; 1 CooK, CORPORATIONS, § 200. o
a1 6 THOMPsoN, CORPORATIONS, § 4968; 1 COOK, CORPORATIONS, § 200,
12 Swinger v. Hutchenson, supra note 7 (while corporation solvent stock-
holder liable for all dividends declared from capital but when corporation
insolvent liability limited to pro rata share of assets necessary to pay
debts of corporation); Gedney v. Sanford, 105 Neb. 112, 179 N. W. 385
(1920) (in suit against stockholders on unpaid subscriptions hold that
all should be joined within state as they were liable only for their pro
'ata share).
13 See statutes of Maine, supra note 9, and Mississippi, supra note 6. For
a discussion of the problem with regard to partnerships and a summary
of the pertinent statutes, see Magruder and Foster, Jurisdiction Over
Partnerships (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 793.
S14 See Arkansas statute cited supra note 6. Accord: Bartlet v. Drew,
57 N. Y. 587 (1874).
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By statute 5 in the principal case the situs of the stock for purposes
of attachment was Delaware, and all of the Georgia stockholders, except
one who had sold his 'stock, were thus subject to service in that state.
Nevertheless without some method of preventing the sale of stocl, this
advantage might have been lost by disposal of the stock to innocent pur-
chasers for value. The court in dismissing the bill followed the orthodox
procedure. Yet a more equitable view would recognize the jurisdiction
of a Delaware court over the stock itself and over a subsequent action
by a judgment creditor against the individual stockholders. The condi-
tional decree is familiar in equity and the court would not have abused
its discretionary power had it allowed the plaintiff a reasonable time to
prosecute its suit in Georgia and at the same time held the Delaware
stock, on an appropriate bond, to await the outcome of that action,1O
DisTrBuTIoN OF BANKRUPT's AsSETS-PROcEEDS RECOVERD Fnom T,%NsFsm
INVALID AS TO ONLY SOME CREDITORS
IN the recent case of Mloore v. Bay I a bankrupt executed a chattel mort-
gage more than four months prior to bankruptcy, which, however, because
of failure to file an intention to record within the statutory period, was
void by state law as to creditors existing at the time the mortgage was
recorded, though valid as to subsequent creditors. This transfer was set
aside in the state court on petition of the trustee in bankruptcy. In a
contest between prior and subsequent creditors as to the distribution of
the proceeds of the property so recovered, it was held by the United States
Supreme Court that they should be distributed ratably among all creditors,
and not only among prior creditors as contended.
Although the power of the trustee to enforce rights of creditors is de-
rived exclusively from the Bankruptcy Act, he can generally enforce these
rights to no greater extent than each creditor could have done under state
law had bankruptcy not intervened. Thus where a conveyance, as in the
instant case, is void only as to a class of creditors, the trustee's recovery
cannot exceed the claims of this class.2 This has appealed to some courts
as cogent reason for applying the state law as well to the distribution of
the fruits of such recovery, especially since the Bankruptcy Act makes
no specific provision for such a contingency.3 Accordingly it has fre-
15 DEL. REV. CODE (1915) § 1986; see Bouree -. Trust Francais Co., 14
Del. Ch. 332, 127 At. 56 (1924).
6 No such machinery has been utilized by the courts. But in Rice v.
Sharpleigh Hardware Co., 85 Fed. 559 (C. C. W. D. Tenn., 1898), a
foreign corporation obtained a judgment in a state court under a pro-
cedure prohibiting a counterclaim. The defendant in the first action
garnished this judgment and sued the foreign corporation in the federal
court. While it was held that the plaintiff could not garnishee himself,
the court retained the action till the issue could be decided in a suit
against the foreign corporation. See Foster, Place of Trial i Civil Action
(1980) 43 HARV. L. iEv. 1217; Foster, Place of Trial-nterstate Applica-
tion of Intrastate Methods of Adjusitzent (1930) 44 HAIW. L. REV. 41.
1284 U. S. 4, 52 Sup. Ct. 3 (1931).
2 Globe Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin, 236 U. S. 288, 35 Sup. Ct. 377
(1914); Bergin v. Blackwood, 141 Blinn. 325, 170 N. W. 508 (1919);
Scales v. Holje, 41 Cal. App. 733, 183 Pac. 76 (1919); REMINGTON, BANK-
Rurrc (3d ed. 1923) § 1517.
3 § 65: "Dividends of an equal per centum shall be declared and paid on
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quently been held that only creditors as to whom a transaction is void
by state law may benefit by the trustee's recovery.4 But when a trustee
acts under Section 67 (c) (3) to preserve a lien obtained by a creditor
within the four months' period it has long been settled/ that he must
enforce it for the benefit of all creditors, regardless of the state law.0 In
extending this latter rule of distribution to the situation in which no lion
has attached within the period, the instant decision settles a marked conflict.
Except in regard to illegal preferences, the trustee must generally
predicate his right to proceed against property either upon his position
as successor to the bankrupt's title 6 or as subrogee to creditors' rights.'
In the former case, the question of distribution of property might arlse
only when the trustee must also rely on his position as a "creditor armed
with process" under Section 47 (2),8 as for example when he recovers prop-
erty which the bankrupt had sold but kept in his possession, inducing re-
liance by creditors thereon so that the purchaser was estopped to deny the
bankrupt's title. Since the trustee in such event asserts the estoppel not
as subrogee of the misled creditors, but by virtue of the independent
power conferred on him by Sec. 47 (2),9 it would seem that the general
policy of equal distribution should not be disturbed. Where property is
recovered by the trustee through his subrogation under sections '10 (o)
and 67 (a, b) to creditors' rights to set aside fraudulent conveyances
and liens invalid for want of record, the decisions on the method of dis-
tribution have heretofore been in decided conflict. But since in the instant
case the trustee's right to set aside the mortgage was based on both these
sections, it seems safely predictable that in all such cases, the same rule
of ratable distribution will follow. It would seem clearly applicable, for
example, where the trustee sets aside an ordinary fraudulent conveyance,10
all allowed claims, except such as have priority or are secured." The
result of the instant case is thus an application of § 65 to funds realized
through the trustee's subrogation to creditors' rights.
4 See infra, footnotes 10, 12, 14, 15, 16.
5 Globe Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin, supra note 2.
6 Bankruptcy Act, § 70 (a).
7Ibid. §§ 70 (e), 67 (a), (b), (c). See RE.MINGTON, op. cit. supra, note 2,
§ 1402. For the rule as to distribution when the trustee proceeds under
§ 67 (c) see Globe Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin, supra, note 2.
8 The purpose of the section is to enable the trustee to avoid transfers,
etc., which by state law only a lien creditor is entitled to avoid. Previously
it had been held that in such a situation the trustee stood in the shoes
of the bankrupt, and was powerless to act unless some creditor had
attached a lien within four months of bankruptcy. York Mfg. Co. v.
Cassell, 201 U. S. 344, 26 Sup. Ct. 481 (1905). The effect of § 47 (2)
is to give the trustee the status of a "creditor armed with process", ir-
-respective of whether such a creditor existed before bankruptcy or not.
See REMINGTON, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 1404, 1547.
9 See Bergin v. Blackwood, supra, note 2; In re Irwin, 268 Fed. 162 (W.
D. Pa. 1920) ; In re Thompson, 205 Fed. 556 (D. N. J. 1913); REMINGTON,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 1410. Of. Miller Rubber Co. v. Citizens' Trust &
Savings Bank, 233 Fed. 488 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916) (consignment); Clark
-v. Snelling, 205 Fed. 240 (C. C. A. 1st, 1913) (record title left in bank-
rupt after conveyance). There are apparently no cases relating to the
,distribution of such recovery.
lo In re Kohler, 159 Fed. 871 (C. C. A. 6th, 1908); Mullen v. Warner,
11 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); cf. Cohen v. Schultz, 43 F. (2d)
340 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930). Contra: American Trust & Savings Bank v.
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or an unlawful sale in bulk," which by state law is void only as to
existing creditors; or an unrecorded mortgage which is deemed void only
as to subsequent creditors.m1 Similarly when he enforces the liability of
corporate officers for misuse of corporate funds on the ground that such
action is a fraudulent conveyance as to creditors,13 although it has been
generally held that such liability runs only to existing creditors. 4 The
same is true of an illegal payment of dividends to stockholders of a ban-
rupt corporation.S In at least one state that bases stockholders' liability
for -watered stock on the "fraud" theory, the trustee has been permitted
to enforce it, on the theory that the watered issue is a fraudulent transfer;
and therefore under the rule of the instant decision any recovery should
enure to the benefit of all creditors,16 although it is well settled that only
subsequent creditors have a complaint.'?
While the result of the instant case has appeared to some courts to
Duncan, 254 Fed. 780 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918). See also (1927) 36 YA=E L. J.
417; REmINGToN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1539.
11 Dodd v. Raines, 1 F. (2d) 658 (N. D. Ga. 1924); see Brown v.
Kossove, 255 Fed. 806 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919).
2Becer Co. v. Gill, 206 Fed. 36 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913) ; In re Rosenthal,
238 Fed. 597 (S. D. Ga. 1916); In re Rosen, 23 F. (2d) 687 (D. Md.
1928). Contra: Simmons v. Greer, 174 Fed. 655 (C. C. A. 4th, 1909);
In re Riehl, 200 Fed. 455 (D. Md. 1912); In re Cannon, 121 Fed. 582
(D. S. C. 1903); In re Wade, 185 Fed. 664 (W. D. Mo. 1911). The same
would seem applicable to an unrecorded conditional sales contract. Augusta
Grocery Co. v. Southern Moline Plow Co., 213 Fed. 786 (C. C. A. 4th,
1914); Townsend v. Ashepoo Fertilizer Co., 212 Fed. 97 (C. C. A. 4th,
1914); In re Farmers' Co-op. Co., 202 Fed. 1008 (D. N. D. 1913). And
to an unrecorded bailment. In re Tansill, 17 F. (2d) 413 (W. D. S. C.
1922).
33 Dean v. Shingle, 198 Cal. 652, 246 Pac. 1049 (1926); see Oliver v.
Brennan, 292 Fed. 197, 201 (N. D. Cal. 1923). Such a cause of action
also runs to the corporation, and may be brought by the trustee on that
theory under § 70 (a) (5). But sometimes the trustee is forced to rely
on the creditors' claims, as for instance, when the corporation is cstopped
by its ratification, or in the case of a one man corporation. Scales v.
Holje, supra, note 2; McCullan v. Buckingham Hotel Co., 198 Mo. App.
107, 199 S. _W. 417 (1917); THOMIS0N, CoRORATIONs (3d ed. 1927) § 1528.
Cf. REmINGTON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1210.
-In re Franklin Brewing Co., 263 Fed. 512 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912);
THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 13, § 1415.
-But dicta in the only eases in which the problem has been considered
indicate that only existing creditors may participate in the trustee's re-
covery. See Mackall v. Pocock, 136 Minn. 8, 161 N. W. 228 (1911);
Rateliff v. Clendennin, 232 Fed. 61, 65 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916). Cf. RsMuIr-
TON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1209.
16 None of the existing cases has reached this result. Grand Rapids
Trust Co. v. Nichols, 199 Mich. 126, 165 N. W. 667 (1917); cf. Courtney
v. Youngs, 202 Mich. 384, 168 N. W. 441 (1918). It is more commonly
held that when such liability is based on the "fraud" theory, the trustee
cannob enforce it. In re Huffman-Salvar Roofing Paint Co., 234 Fed.
798 (N. D. Ala. 1916).
- Bonbright, Shareholders' Defenses Against Liabiity to Crcditors
(1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 408; cf. REMINGTON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1207.
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work hardship on those creditors whose claims the trustee prosecutes,1 9
it is amply justified by the exigencies of administration. A contrary rule
would necessarily embarrass speedy liquidation, and increase costs, since
it would require an ascertainment as to which creditors are entitled to
share, which in most cases would involve the further difficulty of splitting
of current accounts.' 9 A contrary rule, moreover, would enable a pro-
spective bankrupt to prefer one group of creditors over another by the
simple expedient of making a fraudulent conveyance.
20
ADOPTION BY PARENT CORPORATION OF SUBSIDIARY'S CONTRACT TuaovnII
LEASE OF ITS PROPERTY
AN unusual use of the lease to remove a subsidiary corporation from
financial difficulties is presented in the case of American Cyanamid Co.
v. Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer Company." The plaintiff had contracted
with the subsidiary of the defendant for the purchase of phosphate rock,
the purchaser to obtain the benefit each year of any price lower than his
contract price which the subsidiary might fix for any sale followed by
delivery in that year. The defendant, owning all the stock of the sub-
sidiary, leased the latter's property to itself for a term of thirty years,
and at the same time succeeded in persuading all the other customers of
the subsidiary to cancel contracts made with it at burdensome pro-war
prices, and to substitute therefor cost-plus contracts made directly with
itself. The plaintiff refused to cancel his contract with the subsidiary,
and claimed adoption of it by the defendant, so that he was entitled to
a rebate equivalent to the amount by which his contract price exceeded
that of the lowest cost-plus contract made by the defendant to Its other
customers. A directed verdict for the plaintiff in the lower court was
reversed, and the case remanded with instructions favorable to the de-
fendant.
While a parent corporation has been required to fulfill existing contract
obligations of its subsidiary upon which the latter has defaulted,9 the
instant case presents an attempt to extend a contract provision operative
with reference to contracts entered into by the subsidiary so that it would
operate with respect to sales contracts entered into by the parent alone.
When the parent has been held liable for the existing obligations of its
subsidiary, inadequacy of the latter's capital, 3 lack of independent manage-
ment structures,4 fraud in the use of the parent-subsidiary device to
i8 See American Trust & Savings Bank v. Duncan, supra note 10. See
also (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 417.
1 9 See In re Farmers' Co-op. Co., supra note 12, at 1010.
20 See In re Kohler, supra note 10, at 873.
-'51 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
2 Douglas and Shanks, Insulation From Liability thrqetghj Subsidiary
Corporations (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 193, 210, et 9eq.
3 Luckenbach S. S. Company v. W. R. Grace & Company, 267 Fed, 676
(C. C. A. 4th, 1920).
4 S. G. V. Company of Delaware v. S. G. V. Company of Pennsylvania,
264 Pa. 265, 107 Atl. 721 (1919) (salaries and prices of subsidiary fixed
by parent); Dillard & Coffin Company v. Richmond Cotton Oil Company




escape contract,3 or statutory liabilities@3 are usually seized upon to ra-
tionalize the result reached. At times, however, cases have been decided
solely on the presence or absence of inequity, indicating that substantial
injustice to the suing creditor may be the controlling factor.
In the instant case, however, none of these factors were present. The
plaintiff had received complete delivery of the goods called for by his
contract at a contract price much below prevailing prices. The rebate
clause of his contract was evaded as part of a legitimate reorganization
plan to prevent the failure of the subsidiary, the evasion being at most
a minor phase of the plan. The extent of the obligation under the rebate
clause in the plaintiff's contract was conditioned upon affirmative acts of the
subsidiary, L e., sales to others at lower prices. A comparable provision
has recently been construed as limited to acts of the party to the con-
tract, hence placing no obligation upon a possessor corporation after a
merger.8 Similarly where a corporation mortgage contained an after-
acquired property clause, likewise dependent upon affirmative acts for its
operation, it has been held that such a clause does not, upon consolidation,
create a lien on property acquired by the consolidated corporation,5 despite
the fact that a stronger case for carrying over the obligation is pre-
sented in such a situation than in that of the instant case. In order to
hold that a contract with the subsidiary should have the unusual effect
claimed by the plaintiff the burden should be upon him to show an expre~s
adoption or facts unequivocally indicating adoption of his contract by the
parent.l3 A ere isolated lapses from the ritual of separate corporate or-
ganization such as those chiefly relied upon by the plaintiff in the instant
case 1 should not be sufficient.
5Rice v. Sanger Bros., 27 Ariz. 15, 229 Pac. 397 (192-1); Donovan v.
Purtell, 216 Ill. 629, 75 N. E. 334 (1905).
6 United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 220 U. S. 257, 31 Sup. Ct. 067
(1911); United States v. Reading Company, 253 U. S. 26, 40 Sup. Ct.
425 (1920).
7 In re Watertown Paper Company, 169 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909);
Pittsburgh & Buffalo Company v. Duncan, 232 Fed. 584 (C. C. A. 6th,
1916); First National Bank of Seattle v. 'alton, 146 Wash, 367, 262
Pac. 984 (1928).
8 Ducasse v. American Yellow Taxi Operators, Inc., 224 App. Div. 516,
231 N. Y. Supp. 51 (2d Dep't 1928). "But in so far as the extension of
the contract depended on the will of the lessee, the possessor corporation
is not bound, for the fleet was increased by it and not by the merged
corporation." Ibid- at 522, 231 N. Y. Supp. at 57.
9 Susquehanna Trust & Safe Deposit Company v. United Tel. & Tel.
Company, 6 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925); Guaranty Trust Company
of New York v. New York & Queens County Ry. Company, 253 N. Y.
190, 170 N. E. 887 (1930).
10 Thus in Wiggins Ferry Company v. Ohio & Mississippi Ry. Company,
142 U. S. 396, 12 Sup. Ct. 188 (1892), the court declared an adoption
-where the original party to the contract ceased to figure in it and the
defendant began to carry it on and enjoy its benefits. To prevent this
result in the instant case phosphate to fill the plaintiff's order was de-
livered to the subsidiary by the parent. It was shipped by the subsidiary
to whom payment was made and correspondence exchanged respecting
deliveries under the contract.
- Much faith was placed in two letters concerning plaintiff's contract
written by the parent instead of the subsidiary.
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LIABILITY FOR FEEs OP BANKRUPTCY OFFICIALS IN JUDICIAL SALES F I= OF
LIENS
IN Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, Treasurer,' the United States Supreme
Court approved a judicial sale free of liens in bankruptcy proceedings.
In so doing, it bestowed its sanction upon a device which has been employed
by bankruptcy courts at their discretion for over thirty years despite the
absence of any express authorization in the present Bankruptcy Act.,
It has also been employed in equity receiverships,3 and though apparently
not thus far utilized in corporate reorganizations, its simplicity and
flexibility would seem to render it a useful instrument supplementing the
customary foreclosure sale.4 In the course of its development the rules
governing the -operation of this device have become fairly well established.
But there remains some doubt as to who should pay the fees of bankruptcy
officials upon the consummation of an unencumbered sale when the proceeds
thereof are inadequate to satisfy valid liens. Normally the claim of a
lien creditor is transferred to the proceeds of the sale by the order decree-
ing it5 and if determined to be valid, should be paid in full with interest
up to the time of payment by the purchaser.c But if the general estate
be insufficient, the costs of preserving the particular property and of its
sale, including reasonable compensation to the trustee for his services in
that connection, may be imposed upon the lienor.1 He is not, however,
usually charged with the commissions of the bankruptcy officers,8 although
a contrary result has occasionally been reached by implying consent to,0
3 52 Sup. Ct. 115 (1931) (sale free of state lien for taxes).
2 6 'REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (3d ed. 1923) §§ 2577-2616.
2 As when its use would enable an advantageous disposition of the prop-
erty as an entirety, First National Bank v. Shedd, 121 U. S. 74, 7 Sup. Ct.
807 (1887); or would quickly convert burdensome property, Broadway
Trust Company v. Dill, 17 F. (2d) 486 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927).
4(f. Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Upset Price (1927) 27 COL.
L. Rnv. 132, 137.
- George Carroll & Bro. Company v. Young, 119 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 3d,
1903) ;
IPeople's Homestead Ass'n v. Bartlette, 33 F. (2d) 561 (C. C. A. 5th,
1929).
7 No general estate: In re Prince & Walter, 131 Fed. 546 (M. D. Pa.
1904); In re Hansen & Birch, 292 Fed. 898 (N. D. Ga. 1923). Accord, no
evidence as to sufficiency of general estate: Gugel v. New Orleans National
Bank, 239 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917). Cf. In re Stewart, 193 Fed, 791
(E. D. La. 1912).
8 In re Utt, 105 Fed. 754 (C. C. A. 7th, 1901) ; Norton Jewelry Company
v. Hinds, 245 Fed. 341 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917); Virginia Securities Corpora-
tion v. Patrick Orchards, 20 F. (2d) 78 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927); In the matter
of Charles A. Richardson, 16 A. B. R. (N. S.) 212 (E. D. La. 1930). Accord,
when general estate sufficient though lienor has consented to sale: In ro
Anders Push Button Telephone Company, 136 Fed. 995 (S. D. N. Y. 1905);
In re Harralson, 179 Fed. 490 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910); In re Lowell Textile
Company, 288 Fed. 989 (D. Mass. 1923).
9 Lienor purchaser at sale: In re Barber, 97 Fed. 547 (D. Minn. 4th
Div. 1899); In re Sanford Furniture Manufacturing Company, 126 Fed.
888 (E. D. N. C. 1903); In re Columbia Cotton Oil & Provision Corpora-
tion, 210 Fed. 824 (C. C. A. 4th, 1913); Becker v. Thomas, 14 F. (2d)
829 (C. C. A. 1th, 1926). Accord, though no actual consent to sale: In
re West, 232 Fed. 903 (M. D. Pa. 1916). Cf. In re Stewart, supra note 7
[Val. 41634
1932] NOTES
or waiver of 1 the imposition of these fees from a lienor's acquiescence
in the sale. Clearly, however, this furnishes no consistent criterion of
responsibility since consenting lienors have as often been held immune
from such liability.l It appears, however, that in a majority of the
cases in which a lienor has been required to pay these fees, he has been
the purchaser at the sale.12 And this fact would seem to provide a more
desirable criterion, since when the lienor has been benefited by being
able to purchase the entire property as a unit free of the claims of his
fellow lienors, it is equitable that he should reimburse the bankruptcy
officials for their services in enabling him to do so.
POWER OF STATE TO OBsTRuCT FoREsHoRE WiTHOUT ComPEnsATioN To
RIPARIAN OWNER
THE Iowa State Board of Conservation sought to erect a "turn-around"
for automobiles which would ex-tend over the waters of a navigable lake in
front of a riparian owner's property, cutting off his access to the water and
necessitating the destruction of his boat house and wharf. The owner
brought suit to enjoin the construction, on the ground that no compensation
was provided for. In its decision, denying relief,' the Supreme Court of
Iowa first conceded the general rule that a riparian owner has a right
of access over the foreshore, including the right to wharf out to navi-
gability,2 although this involved over-ruling a previous decision; a but it
then held that, while the structure would not aid navigation, yet since
it was designed for use by the public, its erection lay within the statutory
powers of the board.
(agreement by trustee to waive fees). Third party purchaser: In re
Torchia, 188 Feb. 207 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911) (issue as to imposition of any
charges whatever); In re Chambersburg Silk Manufacturing Co., 190 Fed.
411 (M. D. Pa. 1911). Accord: In re Tebo, 101 Fed. 419 (D. W. Va. 1900)
(disapproved in In re Howard, 207 Fed. 402, 414 (N. D. N. Y. 1913); In
re Cramond, 145 Fed. 966 (N. D. N. Y. 1906).
:o See In re Vulcan Foundry & Machine Company, 180 Fed. 671, 675
(C. C. A. 3d, 1910) (lienor purchaser).
- See cases cited supra note 8.
12 See cases cited supra notes 9 and 10, particularly In re West, (consent
implied from fact of purchase).
IPeck v. Alfred Olsen Construction Co., 238 N. W. 416 (Iowa 1931) (four
judges dissenting). A petition for a rehearing has been granted.
2 Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497 (U. S. 1870) ; Town of Brool~haven
v. Smith, 188 N. Y. 74, 80 N. E. 665 (1907); 1 FARNHAM, WATE:SS , ND
WATER RIGHTS (1904) §§ 66-67d. Contra: Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash.
236, 26 Pac. 539 (1891). Almost every decision denying the existence of
a right of access has subsequently been nullified by a statute expressly
recognizing it. See Note (1898) 40 L. R. A. 593, 604. Existence of the
right seems to have been conceded even in some Iowa decisions. See Musser
v. Hershey, 42 Iowa 356, 361 (1876); Renwick, Shaw & Crossett v. Daven-
port & Northwestern Ry. Company, 49 Iowa 664, 670 (1878). Possession
of the right does not depend on ownership of the soil below high-water
mark. See Alexandria & Fredericksburg Ry. Company v. Faunce, 72 Va.
761, 764 (1879); GOULD, WATERS (3d ed. 1900) § 148.
Tomlin v. Dubuque, Bellevue & Mississippi R. R. 32 Iowa 100 (1871).
The rule of this ease, denying the existence of a right of access, has been
widely criticized. See Backus v. City of Detroit, 49 Mich. 110, 113, 13
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It is generally conceded that the right of a riparian to access across
the foreshore is subject to federal control of commerce 4 and to the exercise
of the state's police power in the interest of navigation.r But the decisions
indicate that these powers are restricted to the enactment of regulatory
and protective measures. Thus the state can prohibit the building of
piers and wharves beyond such harbor and dock lines as it may establish,d
and any pier which obstructs navigation can be abated as a public nuisance
without compensation." But where the state, in the course of improving
navigation, interferes with a wharf, lawfully constructed by a riparian
owner in the exercise of his right of access, compensation must be pad.8
On the other hand, in the absence of damage to physical property, the
state incurs no liability for construction in aid of navigation, even though
access is completely cut off, as by the erection of a wall or pier away
from but directly in front of the upfand. But that benefit to navigation
is a condition precedent to immunity from liability is indicated by de-
cisions holding that a railroad must compensate a riparian owner whose
access is cut off by the construction, under state authority, of tracks along
the foreshore.10 It is difficult to see why the same rule should not apply
as well to governmental agencies, and in Matter of the City of New York It
it was held that the city, even under state authority, could not build a
speedway along a river between high and low water mark without com-
pensating riparian owners for loss of access. When, as in the principal
case, this loss of access is accompanied by the destruction of phylical
property, the denial of compensation would seem to be an unwarranted
extension of the police power beyond its protective function? 2
N. W. 380, 381 (1882); GOULD, WATERS § 151; Note (1892) 15 L. R. A.
618. See note 10 infra.
"Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 21 Sup. Ct. 48 (1900).
5 Sage v. Mayor, etc. of the City of New York, 154 N. Y. 61, 47 N. E.
1096 (1897).
G Presser v. Northern Pacific R. R., 152 U. S. 59, 14 Sup. Ct. 628 (1894);
State v. Sargent & Company, 45 Conn. 358 (1877); 1 LEWIS, EblINUNT
Do-,IN (3d ed. 1909) §§ 93, 103.
7 See Town of Brookhaven v. Smith, supra note 2, at 87, 80 N. E. at 670.
8 See Yates v. Milwaukee, supra note 2, at 507; Scranton v. Wheeler,
supru note 4, at 153, 21 Sup. Ct. at 53; United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S.
445, 471, 23 Sup. Ct. 349, 357 (1903).
9 Sage v. Mayor, etc. of the City of New York, supra note 5; Scranton
v. Wheeler, supra note 4. The Supreme Court defines "taking" in the
constitutional sense to mean an interference with physical property, and
holds that there is no liability for consequential injury. The complete
destruction of a valuable and recognized property right seems more than
a consequential injury to it. See Cormack, Legal Conceptsi in Cases of
Eminent Domain (1931) 41 YALE L. J- 221; Note (1905) 67 L. R. A. 820,
842 et seq.
lo Rumsey v. New York &.New England R. R., 133 N. Y. 79, 30 N. E9.
654 (1892), overruling Gould v. Hudson River R. R., 6 N. Y. 522 (1852);
Delaplaine v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. 42 Wis. 214 (1877). Conttra:
Tomlin v. Dubuque, Bellevue, & Mississippi R. R., supra note 3, overruled
in the principal case; Stevens v. Paterson & Newark R. R., 34 N. J. L.
532 (1870).
11168 N. Y. 134, 61 N. E. 158 (1901). See Coudert, Riparian Rights;
A Perversion of Stare Decisis (1909) 9 COT. L. Rv. 217, 227.




CONFIR ATION OF A COMPOSMOIN IN BANKRUPTCY AS BAR TO SECOND
CONFIRMLATION WITHIN SIX YEARS
By Section 12 (d) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1 the confirmation of a com-
position is denied if the debtor has been "guilty" of any acts which would
bar his discharge; by Section 14 (b) (5) 2 a direct petition for "discharge
in bankruptcy" cannot be heard if the debtor has been granted a "discharge
in bankruptcy" within six years; 3 and under Section 14 (c) 4 the con-
firmation of a composition discharges the bankrupt from his debts. But the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has recently held in the
case of Isberg v. Butler Brothers 3 that the confirmation of a composition
does not bar a second confirmation within six years. The court reasoned,
first, that Section 14 (c) does not render a confirmation the equivalent
of a "discharge in bankruptcy" within the contemplation of Section 14
(b) (5), since the methods of procedure are totally different, and second,
that the term "guilty" in Section 12 (d) (2) denotes intentional wrong-
doing.
If the first argument were sound, it would seem logically to follow that
on a direct petition by the bankrupt a discharge would not be barred by
a confirmation within the previous six years. Yet the courts have uniformly
decreed otherwise.6 And the cases 7 which are cited to support the court's
second argument are not concerned with Section 12 (d) (2), but only with
provisions of Section 14 (b), other than 14 (b) (5),s which were held to
require a fraudulent act by the bankrupt before he could be denied a dis-
charge. Moreover, if intentional wrongdoing were a necessary element
in any act which would bar a confirmation, the consideration of whether
such confirmation is the equivalent of a discharge, to which the court de-
votes the major part of its opinion, would be unnecessary, since in that
event not even a discharge on a direct petition would bar a subsequent
confirmation within six years.
Nevertheless, the decision is not without some justification. Although in
ordinary bankruptcy proceedings a debtor is precluded from obtaining
more than one discharge within six years,0 nevertheless he may have more
130 STAT. 550 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 30 (1926). Under the provisions of
this Section, a bankrupt whose offer of a composition has been accepted
by a majority of his creditors, representing a majority in amount of claims,
may invoke the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to compel the assent
of the minority.
232 STAT. 798 (1903), 11 U. S. C. § 32 (1926).
'For a criticism of this arbitrary time limit, see Douglas, Some Func-
tional Aspects of Bankruptcy (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 329, 360.
30 STAT. 550 (1898) ; 11 U. S. C. § 32 (1926).
53 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931).
Rosenberg v. Borofsky, 295 Fed. 500 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924) ; In re Radley,
252 Fed. 205 (N. D. N. Y. 1918); In re Massell, 285 Fed. 577 (D. Mass.
1922); In re Holst, 45 F. (2d) 661 (E. D. N. Y. 1930).
_As to other situations where a confirmation of a composition is given
the full effect of a discharge in bankruptcy, see REMINGTON, BANiRuPTCY
(3d ed. 1924) § 3059.
7 Gilpin v. Merchants National Bank, 165 Fed. 607 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1908);
Firestone v. Harvey, 174 Fed. 574 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909); In re Rosenthal,
231 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
8 See Gilpin v. Merchants National Bank, supr, note 7, at 610, where
the court expressly excludes § 14 (b) (5) in referring to the provisions
of Section 14 (b) that require a fraudulent intent.
9 Section 14 (b) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act, supra note 2.
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than one adjudication within that period and his property will be dis-
tributed each time among his creditors.10 Moreover, if a bankrupt Is to be
limited to but one discharge within six years, whether obtained in regular
bankruptcy proceedings or by confirmation, majority creditors must be
denied a possibly desirable composition where he has obtainedi a prior
discharge within the statutory period. But these considerations would
seem to be outweighed by the argument that Section 14 (b) (5) is do-
signed to discourage habitual bankruptcy and will be ineffectual if pro-
fessional bankrupts may obtain within the statutory period the equivalent
of a second discharge by a confirmation.1
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BAD CHECX STATUTES
IT has recently been held in South Dakota v. Portwood I that a "bad check"
statute, with a provision that prosecution should be barred if the check
were honored or if the drawer should prove that he had issued it without
intent to defraud and should pay into court the amount of the check and
costs violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for
debt founded upon contract. The decision proceeded upon the theory that
the penalty appeared to be inflicted for failure to make satisfaction and
not for the original issuance of the check.2
Of the universally enacted legislation directed against the utterance of
worthless checks, the most typical statute constitutes the intent to defraud
an essential element of the crime and only assists the prosecution by pro-
viding that the fact of dishonor, or sometimes dishonor plus knowledge
of the insufficiency of funds, is prima, facie evidence of such intent.0 The
constitutionality of these statutes is now unquestioned.4 When it became
apparent, however, that the presumption of intent could be rebutted in
situations which appeared to involve evils against which the statutes were
aimed, more comprehensive legislation was enacted.5 And to the same end
a number of statutes dispense entirely with the intent requirement.0 De-
spite the apparent harshness of this latter type of statute, it has never had
the effect of penalizing an innocent mistake by bank or depositor. The
1.0 See In re Carmichael, 300 Fed. 255 (N. D. Ala. 1924) ; In re Johnson,
233 Fed. 841, 843 (S. D. Ala. 1916).
2lFor the argument that even compositions obtained without invoking
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court should be considered grounds for
the denial of a discharge, see Douglas, op. cit. supra note 3, at 361.
'238 N. W. 879 (S. D. 1931).
2 Accord: Burnam v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 410, 15 S. IV. (2d) 256
(1929).
3 See 2 PAToN's DIGEST (1926) § 1260a. Vermont has an additional
law that the maker of a check who knows that there are not sufficient
funds in the bank for its payment and which is not paid upon presentation
shall be liable in tort, and the Supreme Court of that state has recently
held that fraud or deceit are not essential elements of the right of action
thereby created. North Adams Beef and Produce Company v. Cantor, 156
Atl. 879 (Vt. 1931).
4 State v. Meeks, 30 Ariz. 436, 247 Pac. 1099 (1926); Ex parto Shackle-
ford, 64 Cal. App. 78, 220 ,Pac. 430 (1923); Hollis v. State, 152 Ga. 182,
108 S. E. 783 (1921).
See Legislation (1931) 44 HARe. L. REv. 451, 455.
z No intent is now required in Arkansas, Kansas, Mississippi, North
Carolina, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
1932] NOTES
North Carolina statute, for example, requires knowledge of the insufficiency
of funds at the time of utterance.7 The North Dakota statutes has been
construed to mean that there is no violation if the person who mahes or
delivers a check has sufficient funds in the bank on presentation, or has
an arrangement with the bank that the check will be paid, or has reason-
able expectations of having funds in the bank when the check shall be
presented for payment 9 And by three of the statutes which dispense
with the intent requirement, prosecution is barred by satisfaction of the
check, usually within a specified number of days after dishonor.'0
The decision in the instant case, invalidating this last type of statute,
is inharmonious with the views of other courts. In Kansas a similar
statute has been upheld on the theory that the offense penalized was not
the non-payment of the debt, but resort to a practice considered demoral-
izing to business. 1 The Georgia court read into their statute an implied
requirement of fraud and thus brought it within the exception contained
in the constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt.12 And
while an Alabama statute which barred prosecution after satisfaction was
held invalid, the court implied that it would have reached a contrary
result had not the Alabama constitutional interdiction of imprisonment
for debt been unique in omitting an exception in cases involving fraud.13
THE MANUFACTURE O' STATE OR FEDERAL JURISDICTION
PURSUANT to an Oklahoma wrongful death statute I which required that
proceedings thereunder be brought by the administrator and that damages
recovered be divided between the widow and children, an Oklahoma ad-
ministratrix instituted three successive actions in Oklahoma courts against
a Louisiana corporation doing business in Oklahoma, and alleged to have
negligently caused the death of her husband in that state. Each action
-was removed by the corporation on grounds of diversity of citizenship,
motions to remand were overruled, and each was thereupon dismissed by
the administratrix. To obviate the diversity of citizenship between the
parties, the widow then resigned as administratrix, and the plaintiff, a
7 N. C. CODE ANN. (Mlichie, 1931) § 4283 (a), upheld in State v. Yarboro,
194 N. C. 498, 140 S. E. 216 (1927).
8 N. D. Laws 1931, c. 128, p. 211.
9 State v. Schock, 58 N. D. 340, 226 N. W. 525 (1929).
o ARK. DIG. STAT. (Supp. 1931) §§ 743, 743a; KAN. REV. STAT. AN.
(1923) c. 21, § 554; S. D. ComP. LAws (1929) § 4253.
The statutes of Maryland, Tennessee, and West Virginia, while requiring
proof of intent, provide that satisfaction constitutes a complete bar to
prosecution. And in twenty states satisfaction rebuts the presumption of
intent. See Legislation (1931) 44 HARv. L. REV. 451, n. 31.
" State v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 207 Pac. 838 (1922). Accord: Collier
v. State, 40 S. W. (2d) 455 (Ark. 1931). See Note (1923) 23 A. L. 1. 459;
Note (1925) 35 A.L.R. 375.
12 Neidlinger v. State, 17 Ga. App. 811, 88 S.E. 687 (1916). Georgia
subsequently enacted a law which includes such intent. GA. PEN. CODE
(1926) § 211 (34).
'
5 Goolsby v. State, 20 Ala. App. 654, 104 So. 906 (1925). The pre-ent
Alabama statute omits the provision that payment is a bar to prosecution
[AL.A. ANN. CODE (1928) § 4158] and has therefore been held constitutional
in Frazier v. State, 135 So. 409 (Ala. App. 1931).
1 OIcLA- CoicP. STAT. ANN. (1921) c. 3, art. 26, §§ 824, 825.
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citizen of Louisiana, was appointed administrator in her Istead by an
Oklahoma probate court. The plaintiff then filed suit in the state courb
on the same cause of action and the corporation again removed to the
federal court. Upon appeal the Federal Supreme Court in Mecom v. Fitz-
simmons Drilling Company 2 sustained the plaintiff's motion to remand for
lack of diversity of citizenship. The Oklahoma statute, charging the ad-
ministrator with responsibility for the conduct of the suit and the distribu-
tion of its proceeds to the proper parties was thought to make the plaintiff
the real party in interest, whose citizenship, therefore, rather than that
of the beneficiaries or of the intestate, was determinative of federal juris-
diction.3 The Court further held that the motive actuating the partleg
to the proceedings was immaterial so long as the plaintiff's appointment
was regular; and that the latter issue could not be collaterally raised.
In reviewing the various devices contrived by parties to an action for
the purpose either of creating or defeating federal jurisdiction the
Supreme Court has quite generally refused to attach significance to the
motive unless the circumstances reveal "fraud." Thus in order to create
diversity of citizenship a plaintiff may properly remove to another
state with a bona fide intention to establish a residence there,4 and in
order to avoid diversity of citizenship a person with a tort cause of action
against a non-resident company need only join as co-defendant a resident
employee of the company if the injured party's cause of action is capable
of being treated as joint. But the precise point at which "fraud" appears
is not always clearly discernible. The contribution of expenses by resi-
dents who have solicited a non-resident to institute the action, has been
found unobjectionable,6 but a change of residence with an intent to return
after the suit, or a transfer of property without any consideration to a
non-resident "sham" corporation,8 or the simulated refusal of a %oard of
directors to take legal proceedings in local courts, thereby enabling a non-
resident stockholder to bring a representative action,0 is sufficient to war-
rant the federal court's dismissal of the action. And while a jury's ex-
oneration of a resident fellow-employee joined for the purpose of defeat-
ing federal jurisdiction,o or a finding that he has no property,12 is not
2 52 Sup. Ct. 84 (Nov. 23, 1931).
3 The Court followed Mexican Central Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U. S. 429,
23 Sup. Ct. 211 (1903), wherein the same holding had been made in the
case of a guardian.
4 See Briggs v. French, 2 Sumner 251, 256 (C. C. 1835).
r Illinois Central R. R. v. Sheegog, 215 U. S. 308, 30 Sup. Ct. 101 (1909);
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. v. Willard, 220 U. S. 413, 31 Sup.
Ct. 460 (1911); Chicago, R. I. & Pacific Ry. v. Schwylart, 227 U. S. 184,
33 Sup. Ct. 250 (1913). See also, regarding conveyance to non-resident,
McDonald v. Smalley, 1 Pet. 620 (U. S. 1828); Smith v. Xernochen, I
How. 198 (U. S. 1849); Irvine Company v. Bond, 74 Fed. 849 (C. C. S. D.
Cal. 1896). 1
6 Wheeler v. Denver, 229 U. S. 342, 33 Sup. Ct. 842 (1913).
7 Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 315, 9 Sup. Ct. 289 (1889).
8 Miller & Lux v. East Side Canal Co., 211 U. S. 293, 29 Sup. Ct. 111
(1908); Southern Realty Co. v. Walker, 211 U. S. 603, 29 Sup. Ct. 211
(1909).
9 Detroit v. Dean, 106 U. S. 537, 1 Sup. Ct. 560 (1883). But of. Chicago
v. Mills, 204 U. S. 321, 27 Sup. Ct. 286 (1907), where the refusal of 'the
directors was in good faith.
10 Whitcomb v. Smithson, 175 U. S. 635, 20 Sup. Ct. 248 (1900).




sufficient, proof that the fellow-employee had no connection with the em-
ployer's negligence has been held evidence of a conspiracy to defeat the
employer's right of removalI
In the principal case the fact that the Louisiana administrator did not
know the deceased or the widow, had no information of the estate of the
deceased, did not come to Oklahoma to be appointed, and consented to be
substituted in the widow's stead merely as a favor to her attorney might
-well indicate a collusive attempt to avoid federal jurisdiction. Two lower
federal courts had previously so held under similar circumstances 3 On
the other hand, it is significant that, while the Federal Judicial Code
specifically condemns collusive creation of federal jurisdiction,a devices
to defeat such jurisdiction are proscribed only if they are deemed re-
pugnant to general policy. And if, in the face of the code stipulation, the
Supreme Court once found itself able to permit Kentucky residents to
create federal jurisdiction by incorporating in another state for the sole
purpose of avoiding the effects of Kentucky law as applied by the courts
of that state,U it is not difficult to perceive why the device in the principal
case did not offend the same court's conception of general good policy.
For here a claim was based on a death caused within a state by a foreign
corporation doing business therein and was brought under the provisions
of a wrongful death statute of that state. In such a situation it seems
reaponable that the defendant corporation should be subject to the same
alleged disadvantages 16 of state trial as are its competitiors and should
not be in a position to contest the plaintiff's efforts to secure such a trialX1
ESTOPPEL OF INSURANCE COMPANY TO VOm POLICY FOR MISTATMENT
INSURANCE policies normally provide that they shall be wholly inoperative
in case of any misstatement in the application therefor. But when such a
misstatement has been caused by the insurance agent and is unknown to the
insured recovery upon the policy has frequently been allowed on the basis
of a waiver or an estoppel., But where the application is attached to the
2 Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U. S. 176, 27
Sup. Ct. 184 (1907).
'
5VCerri v. Akron-People's Telephone Co., 219 Fed. 285 (N. D. Ohio
1914); Carter v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 29 F. (2d) 628 (D. Okla.
1928) (partly on the grounds that the administrator was a mere nominal
party). Contra: Goff's Administrator v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 36 Fed. 299
(C. C. W. D. Va. 1888).
1- Judicial Code § 37, 36 STAT. 1098 (1911), 28 U. S. C. c. 3, § 80 (1920).
1 Black & White Ta-d Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi Co., 276 U. S. 518,
48 Sup. Ct. 404 (1928).
36 Article 2, section 19, of the Oklahoma Constitution provides that in
civil cases and in criminal cases less than felonies, three-quarters of the
number of jurors shall have the power to render a verdict. Cf. Curtis &
Gartside Co. v. Pigg, 39 Okla. 31, 134 Pac. 1125 (1913). In addition
to the probable tendency of the local jury to sympathize with the injured
party, there may be other material advantages to be gained from a federal
trial, such as the power of the judge to comment" on the evidence. Cf.
Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442 (S. D. Ohio 1897).
-" See Frankfurter, Dif.tribution of Judicial Powcr Between U nite
States and State Courts (1928) '13 CoRN. L. Q. 499, 523, et seq.
IAmes v. 1ew York Union Insurance Co., 14 N. Y. 253 (1856); Wood
v. American Fire Insurance Co., 149 N. Y. 382, 44 N. E. 80 (1890).
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policy the insured has been held strictly to its terms.2 This "accessibility
doctrine" finds support in a distorted construction of Section 58 of the
New York Insurance Law, originally enacted to assist the insured by
providing, inter alia that to be part of the contract applications must be
attached to the policy.' In Bollard v. The New York Life Ins. Co.,r this
Section was regarded as making the attached application more a part of
the policy than before and hence less subject to parol "contradiction",
although in the cases allowing proof of an estoppel before its enactment
the application was invariably incorporated into the policy by reference,
It is, however, difficult to perceive the bearing of accessibility upon the
parol evidence rule. The rule might justifiably be invoked to bar a claim
of waiver, which is necessarily predicated upon an agreement, if such
agreement were antecedent to or contemporaneous with the written con-
tract.G But since estoppel is unrelated to agreement and admits the written
contract while declaring it inequitable to enforce, the parol evidence rule
would seem to have no application.7
In the recent case of Bible v. The John Hancock Mutual Life In,"ranvo
Company of Bostons the New York Court of Appeals admitted parol
evidence to show an estoppel with regard to the breach of a policy condl-
tion. In that case, an agent procured the signature of the insured to an
application while she was in a hospital and collected premiums on a policy
there delivered. The policy provided that it should be void if the insured
had attended any hospital within two years unless such attendance was
expfessly waived by the company. The application was not attached and
therefore under Section 58 its terms had no effect. It was held that "keep-
ing the premiums with a knowledge of the existing breach of conditions
.. . gave rise to a- waiver or more properly to an estoppel." If parol
evidence is admissable in this situation, there would seem to be no reason
2 Carmichael v. The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 116 App.
Div. 291, 101 N. Y. Supp. 602 (1st Dep't 1906). Accord: Hook v, Michigan
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 44 Misc. 478, 90 N. Y. Supp. 56 (Sup. Ct. 1004);
aff'd, 139 App. Div. 922, 123 N. Y. Supp. 1121 (3d Dep't 1910).
3 N. Y. CONs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 30.
4 See (1931) 15 MINN. L. REV. 595; Note (1930) 16 CORN. L. Q. 236.
5 98 Misc. 286, 162 N. Y. Supp. 706 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd 228 N. Y. 521,
126 N. E. 900 (1920). Contra: Davern v. American Mutual Liability
Insurance Co., 241 N. Y. 318, 150 N. E. 129 (1925). Both of these cases
were written by the same judge who attempted a distinction based on the
proposition that one dictating an application cannot reasonably rely on
the agent's transcription but can reasonably rely on a transcription from
a mailed application. In both cases the insured signed the final application
containing the false statement.
6 For an exhaustive discussion see VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) pp.
451-495, 528-529.
7Ibid. 451-458, 495-528, especially p. 508, n. 86 for cases holding that the
parol evidence rule does not prevent proof of an estoppel. That this is
further supported by the original character of estoppel as an equity doc-
trine, see 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) § 802.
Nor can the accessibility doctrine be justified on the grounds that the
good faith requisite to'an estoppel is negatived since constructive knowledge
is not sufficient. 2 POMEROY, Op. Cit. § 810, especially at 1665. And this
doctrine further disregards the fact that the policy underlying estoppel in
insurafice law is not that people lack opportunity to read their policies but
do not do so in fact. VANCE, INSURANCE (2d. ed. 1930) 214 et seq.
8 256 N. Y. 458, 176 N. E. 838 (1931).
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for denying its equal admissibility where a representation in the application
is involved. The holding in the ease of Sats v. Massahtwetts Boadbzg &
Insarance Company may, however, obstruct the way to a uniform attain-
ment of this result. There the court denied parol proof of an estoppel
in the case of a "warranty," as distinguished from a representation, in an
application attached to the policy. But this doctrine, based upon a distinc-
tion admitted by the very court that invoked it to be difficult of application,
is to be approved only insofar as by implication it would allow parol proof
of an estoppel in the case of statements other than warranties. And
Section 58 expressly states that application statements purporting to be
made by the insured shall in the absence of fraud be deemed "representa-
tions" and not "warranties."
The "accessibility doctrine" is, however, to some extent reaffirmed by a
,dictum in the Bible case to the effect that if the application is attached
to a policy, controversy as to the scope of the agent's powers is foreclosed
by any limiting clauses therein contained.10 But such clauses have never
been given full effect by the Court of Appeals except through an invocation
of the parol evidence rule and of Section 58. A careful distinction between
waiver and estoppel will delimit the effect of this dictum. Since waiver
rests upon the agent's apparent power to make a binding agreement any
clause in the application which denies this power is usually held effective.'1
But a principal should not be able to prevent an estoppel by limitations
upon his agents' powers in contravention of the established principle that
one cannot exempt himself by contract from liability arising through the
fraud of his agents. 2
INHERITA.NCE TAXATION OF CORPORATE STOCK
BY recent decisions repudiating its former tolerance of multiple taxation
of intangibles the Supreme Court of the United States has held that bonds,
bank deposits, promissory notes and simple debts are not subject to an
inheritance tax in the state where they are physically present or at the
domicile of the debtor." This doctrine; in the case of First National Banl
of Boston v. Maine,2 was said to be "broader than the application thus far
made of it," 3 and was there extended to apply to stock in a Maine cor-
poration left by a Massachusetts decedent. The Court, reemphasizing its
position that multiple taxation of intangibles is discriminatory and in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, went on to base its decision on
the theory that the situs of intangibles is at the domicile of the owner and
that taxation by any other state is consequently without due process of law.
The precise reasoning used gives scant support to the selection of the
9 243 N. Y. 385, 153 N. E. 844 (1926).
2o Supra note 8, at 464, 176 N. E. at 840.
"3-VANcE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 431 et scq.
12 Ibid. In Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 170 N. Y. 13,
62 N. E. 763 (1902), a clause in an application purporting to make the
solicitor the agent of the insured was held invalid as an attempt to contract
contrary to fact.
'Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct.
98 (1930); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1930);
Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54
(1930). See also Comment (1932) 40 Y.=E L. J. 99.
252 Sup. Ct. 174 (Jan. 4, 1932).
s Ibid. 175.
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domicile of the owner of corporate stock as the taxing jurisdiction, Sitos,
primarily denoting physical location, can scarcely be an attribute of the
intangible property rights of which a stock certificate is merely the evi-
dence.4 The term situs may also serve to denote the place where an in-
tangible may be effectively dealt with,r but used thus, it describes only
the result rather than the basis of the decision. Conceding, however, that
only one jurisdiction should be able to tax, the power seems reasonably to
belong to the state which accords the privilege of succession. Since the
great majority of states for their mutual convenience have chosen the
state of domicile as the place of distribution of the testator's assets o It is
there, by common consent, that the privilege of succession is accorded.
4 Pomerance, The Situs of Stock (1931) 17 CORN. L. Q. 43, 46; of. GOOD-
RICH, CONFIICT OF LAWS (1927) 407.
5 Powell, Business Situs of Credits (1921) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 89, 96.
6 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 397.
